Change in North Korea as Kim Jong-un remodels Fortress Juche
The Juche Tower in Pyongyang which is dedicated to the Juche philosophy of Kim Il-sung, the founder of North Korea. (Piu Piu, Courtesy of Shutterstock, Inc.)
The colossal ideological fortress of Juche has stood firm for a long time as the cornerstone of North Korea’s pursuit of revolution and defense against enemies within and without. But it seems that some interesting changes are taking place.
Constructed in the 1950s and ‘60s, Juche (self-reliance) was Kim Il-sung’s version of Marxism-Leninism. Despite his reliance on the Soviet Union and China, Kim sought to forge an independent line in what some say was a bid for leadership of the non-aligned movement.
Fortress Juche was manned in those days by his comrades in the anti-Japanese guerrilla before the nation was founded. Then in the 1990s it was taken over by brave songun (military-first) knights loyal to his son, Kim Jong-il.
At some point in the last ten years, new knights bearing the names ‘nation’ and ‘people’ took up positions in the fortress. The songun knights held their place at first, but in time the young knights became stronger.
Those living within the fortress walls were initially puzzled by the change. But they knew the upstarts had the backing of the leader, Kim Jong-un, and they began to pay attention to what they were doing. As they watched them struggle for economic development and improvement in the quality of life, they saw how the old songun knights seemed to give up, stepping back into a corner and reminiscing about past glory.
We may say now that the knights of nation and people lead in North Korea. However, this doesn’t mean that Fortress Juche is crumbling. Rather, it seems to have been reinforced. It’s the expression that has changed.
This shift is shaping policy and having a significant impact on society outside the fortress. People see new banners fluttering in their towns, urging them to “concentrate all efforts on economic construction.” It’s as if the new knights are riding out of the fortress in vigorous pursuit of growth.
The people within Fortress Juche have come to realize that what has been going on within the walls is closely connected to the changes taking place outside. The new ideological emphasis on nation and people is the link to the new policy direction prioritizing economic development. Like interlocking gears, ideology and policy have begun to turn together, propelling one another forward. As the themes of nation and people drive the policies, the results of economic development, in turn, strengthen the ideology.
With this in mind, let’s consider this month’s International Seminar on Juche Ideology” held on April 14 to commemorate the 112th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birth.
Given how tightly North Korea had sealed its borders until recently because of COVID-19, the opening for this international event was significant. With scholars sympathetic to North Korea from over 20 countries, analysts wondered what Pyongyang had in mind by inviting them.
Judging by the speeches delivered during the symposium and the letters of gratitude sent to Kim Jong-un by participants and their praise of “Kim Jong-un ideology” as the “beacon of hope for progressive humanity,” it seems that Kim wishes to impose his own new ideological stamp without formally replacing the old. By having this endorsed by foreigners, he is signaling to the domestic audience that this is to be set in stone.
In a significant related move, Kim last month referred to the extensive construction at the party’s Central Cadres Training School, scheduled for completion in May, as the “Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il Ideology Academy, Juche Ideology Academy.”
Juche always had its critics among Marxist-Leninists. Its espousal of dialectical materialism and emphasis on the absolute authority of the leader was inherently contradictory. Its core concepts were simply declared, instead of being argued and backed up with empirical evidence. Further, the critics said, it lacked explanatory power, functioning simply as a tool to justify the peculiarities of the dictatorial Kim dynasty.
Kim Jong-un’s attempt to modify rather than completely discard Juche ideology is a pragmatic option to pursue change while underscoring his legitimacy and ensuring continued power. Any abrupt discarding of Juche carries a risk of instability.
Given that Kim has been in power for over a decade, what accounts for his timing?
While he appears to the outside to have had a rock-solid power base from the outset, after his father died in 2011, Kim Jong-un has been solidifying his position. Until now he focused on building up military power and advancing science and technology. This has involved replacing the old songun guard and keeping the new military leaders focussed and content. He has now also solved the question of the survival of the “Mount Paektu” Kim family bloodline.
He is now ready to pay attention to the field of revolutionary thought and theory. That is important because in the collectivist system, ideas are more important than money.
How might he do this? Just as Marxist-Leninism evolved into neo-Marxism and as the Chinese Communist Party has reinterpreted rather than abandoned Mao Zedong Thought, so Kim Jongunism is likely to involve partial changes.
But, to make them, he needs to overcome several obstacles.
Any change must almost certainly involve a measure of openness. But doing this while maintaining the solid power of the supreme leader and the party-centric system will not be easy.
Also, failure to address external issues, notably the nuclear problem, could pose significant hurdles to economic development.
Then there is the likely resistance from conservative factions coupled with external pressures in the form of sanctions.
As we consider this, we should note that whatever is going to happen has started. While maintaining the facade of the Fortress, Kim is restructuring the framework holding it up and advocating new values of the nation and the people.
Heung-kwang is the representative of NK Intellectual Solidarity, an NGO based in Seoul, South Korea. Previously, he served as the chairman of the quarterly magazine North Korean Village, chairman of the board of directors of Samheung North Korean Defector Children’s School, and a policy advisory member of the Ministry of National Defense in South Korea. Before defecting to South Korea in 2004, he was a professor at the Hamheung Communist College in North Korea. He graduated from North Korea’s Kim Chaek University of Technology and received his doctorate from South Korea’s Hansae University Graduate School.
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